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ABSTRACT
At a time of such great turbulence, looking to the future directions of capital markets and their regulation in
developed economies is a particularly risky business. We are in the midst of a great sea change.
Nevertheless, there are several current, and readily observable, phenomena which are likely to shape capital markets
regulation in the near future. First of all, the blurring of the distinctions between developed and developing markets
themselves, as well as that between domestic and international markets, has put into question the adequacy of
existing regulatory frameworks. Also, the transatlantic dialogue, London – New York, has given way to the rise of
“multipolarity”; in an age of instantaneous transmission of information, capital and risk, competing centres of
gravity have emerged. In addition, centuries-old market institutions are undergoing a period of dynamic change,
producing the equivalent of regulatory jetlag. Among international actors, there are calls for what may be the
somewhat indiscriminate widening of the “perimeter” of regulation; costs of compliance mount, regulatory
uncertainty sets in. To the numerous, conflicting and perhaps unrealisable, goals associated with capital markets
regulation has been added detection and prevention of systemic risk. The two great, albeit quite different, capital
market regulatory models (those of the United States and the United Kingdom) have taken a beating; it ist an open
question as to what will take their place. Finally, in face of the virtually insurmountable difficulties of actually
creating a World Financial Regulator (to say nothing of its desirability), two organisations, one created in direct
response to the Global Financial Crisis, and the other, decades-old, are filling the void.
None of these factors operates independently, of course; all interact, contributing to the potential uncertainty and
complexity of outcomes.
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The Wider Context: The Future of Capital Market Regulation in the
Developed Markets
Cally Jordan
INTRODUCTION
“All in all, the future global financial regulatory landscape is more likely to resemble a Japanese garden, with new
details and perspectives emerging at each step, than a centralized and symmetrical jardin à la française.
Consistency will not be uniformly achieved, the boundary between global and local decision-making will remain in
flux and controversial, and a spirit of experimentation and institutional entrepreneurship will be required.”
(Stéphane Rottier, Nicolas Véron, 2010)

At a time of such great turbulence, looking to the future directions of capital markets regulation
in developed economies is a particularly risky business. We are in the midst of a great sea
change.
Nevertheless, there are several current, and readily observable, phenomena which are likely to
shape capital markets regulation in developed economies in the near future:
•

The blurring of distinctions between developed and developing, domestic and
international, markets.

•

The rise of “multipolarity” and dispersion of capital market centres.

•

The transformation of market institutions such as stock exchanges.

•

The changing “perimeter” of regulation and potential indiscriminate overregulation.

•

The rethinking of regulatory goals.

•

The questioning of established regulatory models.

•

The future role of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Organization
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).

None of these factors operates independently, of course; all interact, contributing to the potential
uncertainty and complexity of outcomes.
1. Blurring of Distinctions
For decades now, we have become accustomed to segregating capital markets, considering
separately “developed” and “developing” markets.1 These distinctions, popular in the financial
press, are reinforced by the formal distinctions along similar lines institutionalised by
international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank.
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Even now, these distinctions are less and less compelling, at least among large economies. In
response to the global financial crisis, the G8 quickly transmogrified into the G20.2 No one
doubts the significance of China among the world’s leading capital markets; the HKEx, that
gateway to China, is now the largest exchange in the world by some measures.3 Brazil’s
BM&FBOVESPA, the consolidated futures, commodities and securities exchange, has zoomed
from near oblivion to fourth largest in the world, in less than ten years.4
Contemporaneously, another longstanding distinction, between domestic and international
capital markets, is blurring, a fact also brought home by the global financial crisis. Financial
contagion, a regional phenomenon associated with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, went
global. Contagion demonstrated graphically (and disastrously) that capital markets were not
watertight compartments, constrained by geographical boundaries and regulated by the exercise
of national authority. 5
The blurring of these distinctions has put into question the adequacy of existing regulatory
frameworks as well as proposed regulatory responses. New powerhouses such as China and
Brazil, for better or worse, may be going their own regulatory way. Experiences with the
development, implementation and assessment of international financial standards are fraught
with difficulty. 6 The recently created FSB, successor to that failed initiative, the Financial
Stability Forum, is still in its infancy.
Despite widely publicised pressures to “internationalise” capital markets regulation, there
remains a joker in the pack: the national interest. In the United States, the intensely domestic
focus of the US Congress is offset, to a certain degree, by an experienced and internationally
aware regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). But the SEC is not insulated
from the isolationist winds blowing through Congress. And, elsewhere, there are vivid examples
of the “national” interest prevailing even over obvious self interest, for example, in the rejection
by the Australian Parliament of the proposed merger of the Singapore Exchange with the
Australian Exchange.7
2. Rise of Multipolarity
There was a time when world capital markets revolved around the twin poles of London and
New York. The hegemony of their market practices and regulatory models was somewhat
shaken by the Lamfalussy Report in 2001, a wakeup call for European capital markets and their
regulators,8 and then, a few years later, with the creation of NYSE-Euronext in 2007. Both Paris
and Brussels were brought squarely into the picture. But the transatlantic dialogue, by industry
and regulators alike, continued to drown out other discussions.
No longer. As Rottier and Véron of the Breugel Institute (a Brussels think tank) persuasively
argue9, the once dominant capital markets of the transatlantic corridor are being challenged by
the emergence of other centres of gravity, in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Hong
Kong’s brand new “dim sum” bond market10 is an example, attracting issuers such as the World
Bank and McDonald’s, issuers which would ordinarily be found raising capital in the exempt
Eurobond market.
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Another story, that of Brazil’s BM&FBOVESPA is an especially dramatic one, even by
“emerging” markets standards. At the end of the 1990s, the BOVESPA, as it then was,
considered shutting down. Trading in Brazilian equities had migrated to the NYSE and the
American Depositary Receipt or ADR market;11 there had been virtually no initial public
offerings done in Brazil over a period of several years. Concerted action by regulators,
legislators and the BOVESPA itself (such as the creation of the Nova Mercado or Corporate
Governance Listing Board) revitalised Brazilian capital markets. The BM&FBOVESPA, now
the fourth largest exchange in the world,12 recently announced a cross-listing arrangement with a
Chinese counterpart, the HKEx.13 And, ironically, given that ADRs nearly undermined the very
existence of the BOVESPA, it is now possible for non-Brazilian companies to create BDRs,
Brazilian Depositary Receipts, for trading in Brazil.
There are any number of reasons why rival financial centres would be siphoning capital market
flows away from London and New York. The disarray of markets and regulation in both the US
and the UK immediately springs to mind, as does technology which permits the instantaneous
transmission of information, capital and, as we all discovered recently, risk.
3. Transformation of Market Institutions
The traditional stock exchange is a powerful and very visible symbol of capitalism, with its
imposing architecture and seeming timeless solidity. This centuries old market institution,
however, is undergoing a radical transformation. The flurry of international mergers and
consolidations, completed, proposed and failed, are an outward manifestation of the
transformative effect of technological change. The formal institutional realignments are belatedly
catching up with the technological reality.
Much has been written about the fading importance of the traditional stock exchange and the rise
of competing, virtual exchanges. The Goliaths are changing business models,14 scrambling for
strategic geographic advantage and embracing new products.15 As the merger route has proved a
bumpy one, alliances or alignments are appearing.16 Markets, of any kind, have cultures though
and roots extending back millennia. Despite the flash of international mergers, local markets, in
one form or another, will persist; the niche markets of Luxemburg and Switzerland, for example.
And, as recent experience with NYSE-Euronext demonstrates, even the biggest of international
mergers has not erased the “local” markets involved.
All of this frenetic activity however produces the equivalent of regulatory jetlag. Regulators are
still trying to adjust to that groundbreaking transatlantic merger of NYSE-Euronext. Occurring
barely four years ago, it now seems to have taken place in a different lifetime. The great market
upheaval and change taking place has put enormous stress on even the most basic principles of
regulation and market practice, segregation of clients’ accounts for example.17
Traditional self-regulation of market institutions has been marginalised in many places, 18
especially by the rising tide of formal regulation. However, given the rapidly changing nature of
market institutions themselves and the impossibility of adequate or comprehensive regulatory
responses, at least in the short term, new varieties of self-regulation are likely to appear.
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4 The Changing “Perimeter” of Regulation
Capital markets, especially international capital markets, have always thrived on regulatory
arbitrage, much of which has been relatively benign: grease to the wheels of finance. The
Eurobond market, for example attracted stellar issuers such as The World Bank and McDonald’s
and has been remarkably resistant to formal regulation, seemingly without untoward
consequences.
But the existence of “unregulated” markets, obvious to anyone close to the industry, apparently
came as a great surprise to much of the world. In the United States, the volume of privately
placed securities (that escape most of the regulatory apparatus) exceeded that of publicly offered
securities for the first time several years ago. Now, the dominant capital market in the United
States is the private placement market. As the name implies, it is a private market, and one not
subject to the glare of public scrutiny.
So now, establishing the “perimeter” of regulation is the new mantra of the FSB, the IMF, The
World Bank, IOSCO. Among other things, and crudely put, this implies sweeping the varied and
multi-faceted world of derivatives into the regulatory net. Although indiscriminate regulation of
derivative products has been plaintively decried recently by the head of the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, 19 the forces of torrential regulation are not abating.
At the heart of this particular issue is the artificial, and historically determined, definition of a
“security” in the United States, a product of the fragmented and fiercely territorial regulatory
landscape there. The most well-known financial regulator, the SEC, has never had jurisdiction
over most derivatives; that authority lies, for the most part, with a competing regulator, the
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Although this artificial distinction
among financial products (which results in competing regulatory oversight) has been eliminated
(or never adopted) in many other places in the world, it appears destined to persist in the United
States.20 Some exchanges in the United States, tied as they are now to specified financial
products that are aligned with the jurisdiction of their primary regulator, would welcome the
elimination of these distinctions and an expanded range of tradable products. In emerging
markets, some early adopters of the US regulatory model may demonstrated the same
product/market/regulator fragmentation (Korea, for example), but elimination of the distinctions
has been occurring, and without any undue reticence.
Certainly, the avalanche of regulation precipitated by the global financial crisis is worrisome.
Irrespective of the wisdom, or not, of its substantive provisions, very little of the Dodd Frank
Act21 has actually been implemented.22 Costs of compliance mount, regulatory uncertainty sets
in. By the time implementing agencies such as the SEC plough through their assigned reports
and other mandates, the world’s capital markets will inevitably have moved on.
5. Rethinking Regulatory Goals
Addressing systemic risk has popped up everywhere as a new goal of capital markets
regulation.23 That capital markets, especially international capital markets, could be purveyors
of systemic risk appears ridiculously obvious in hindsight. Systemic risk concerns, though, had
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been the bailiwick of prudential regulators, proceeding on an institution by institution basis, not
capital markets regulators.
Simply adding systemic risk to what is now quite a lengthy list of capital markets regulatory
goals, however, does not necessarily produce results. It may, in fact, be adding one more goal to
an already long list of conflicting, potentially unrealisable, goals. The effectiveness of capital
markets regulation, especially in the United States, is already undermined by the accretion, over
time, of numerous, ideologically determined objectives.
Take, for example, section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933:24
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission [SEC] is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider
or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition
and capital formation.

So here we have stated goals, enshrined in legislation, the oldest, and original, being investor
protection.25 However, the later legislated goals, efficient markets, promotion of competition
and capital raising, counterbalance, not to say undermine, the original goal of (retail) investor
protection. The efficient market hypothesis has long served as a justification for a noninterventionist approach to market regulation, decidedly at odds with retail investor protection.
Much the same can be said of promotion of competitiveness and capital formation, an example
of political ideology disguised as capital markets regulation. US capital markets legislation is
laced through with these competing regulatory goals, intensifying its already dysfunctional
nature.
This may explain the creation of the new US Bureau of Consumer Financial Regulation and its
oversight by the Federal Reserve.26 Taking retail investor protection, to a certain extent at least,
out of the purview of the SEC is quite a radical step, an implicit acknowledgement of the
regulatory difficulties engendered by the burden of competing goals. However, the creation of
new, separate “consumer” or retail investor protection agencies (and there may be emulators
elsewhere)27 entails different kinds of risk, in particular that of low level expertise and lack of
regulatory “clout”.
Additionally, given the beating which the efficient market hypothesis has taken lately, it will be
interesting to see whether “efficiency” goals drop out of the regulatory mix. Certainly, there is
already reregulation of professional investors occurring and a tacit admission that disclosure is
not enough, particularly with respect to retail products.28
Shifting demographics and investment patterns too may force reconsideration of regulatory goals
and their relative priority. The popularity of more conservative investment products or ones
which may have a greater or lesser degree of government backing (for example, Pfandbriefe,
covered bonds, Canada Mortgage Bonds) may in fact be indicative of the market substituting for
ineffective regulation (which may be as it should be).
And, one area of the market in developed economies which has been subject to chronic
regulatory neglect constitutes a disaster in waiting: pension funds and insurance products. The
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potential political ramifications of regulatory and institutional failure in this area are explosive.
For example, the investment models and regulatory guidelines of many large pension schemes
in the United States, such as TIAA-CREF29 or CalPERS30, may be now wildly out of touch with
the new realities of the marketplace (eg., blithe assumptions of a 6% “safe” return on
investment). In addition, the benefits which they provide to retirees are based on the operation of
complex, insurance-like products which few retirees understand. If these scenarios ring a
familiar bell, they should be sounding an alarm, given recent events. As the demographic
profile of the United States shifts inexorably towards an older population, the stresses on these
plans can only increase. A failure would bring misery to millions, many of them educated, vocal,
voters.31
6. Questioning Regulatory Models
For decades now, the United States and the United Kingdom have provided capital markets
regulatory models for the world. Although quite different in structure and regulatory philosophy,
mini SECs and FSAs are scattered all over the globe. However, the original models themselves
are in disarray and under attack on the home front. In the United States, the fragmentation and
complexity of regulatory oversight of capital markets will continue, flying in the face of logic
and common sense. If anything, it will be more of the same, but more of it. At least one positive
sign, though, is the SEC-CFTC-FINRA32 alliance which now presents a more coordinated face to
the world.
In London, the much emulated consolidated financial regulator, the FSA, is currently in the
process of being dismembered, again flying in the face of logic and common sense. “[T]here
was not a clear-cut case for outright abolition of the Financial Services Authority. Fixing it was
a solid option in principle and it was politics that dictated a different result”.33
There is much to lament in each of these instances. The United States has missed the crisisdriven opportunity to rationalise and consolidate its capital markets regulatory framework. The
United Kingdom has trashed a sound regulatory model that had not demonstrably fallen into
disrepair. The reorganisation of regulatory functions, an effort sapping endeavour, comes at a
time when regulatory energies could be put to better use elsewhere.
But, especially in the case of the FSA, many other places in the world, which had adopted its
consolidated financial regulator model, are now left high and dry. Economies such as France or
Germany will make their own decisions to carry on, but small jurisdictions and emerging
markets face a dilemma, whether to persist with a now defunct model or, yet again, follow the
latest UK path, irrespective of its merits.
7. Role of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO)
Crisis has brought to the surface a number of ideas that rise and sink with various currents. One
idea, and a misguided one, is the creation of a World Financial Authority, a supra national
financial regulator structured perhaps along the lines of the WTO. Given the virtually
insurmountable difficulties of actually creating such a regulator (to say nothing of its
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desirability), two organisations, one created in direct response to the global financial crisis, and
the other, decades-old, are filling the void.
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was created in
1999 with a mandate to serve as both a prophylactic against and as an “early warning” beacon
for impending cross-border financial crisis. That it failed miserably at either task is
indisputable. 34 Its successor, the FSB, has an even more challenging mandate, in much choppier
financial waters.35 Will the FSB escape the fate of its predecessor (i.e. irrelevance)? Its early
focus on G-SIFI (Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions) is fraught with
difficulty; housed at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, it would be hard for the
FSB to escape a central bank mentality (lacking in capital market sensibilities); and, arguably, it
is working on the margins (credit rating agencies and executive compensation).
IOSCO, on the other hand, has been in existence since 1983. Originally a somewhat informal
talk shop for developed economy securities regulators and institutions, the composition of its
membership and its role has changed dramatically in the last decade. IOSCO is now an important
forum for the exchange of information among capital markets regulators all over the world, in
both developed and developing economies. The Technical Committee of IOSCO was
instrumental in the development of International Financial Reporting Standards. IOSCO has
assumed the role of a standard setter, and given the considerable technical expertise of its
members, an informed and knowledgeable one. In addition, it has now taken on some aspects of
a think tank, such as the OECD, in undertaking research and publishing technical reports.
IOSCO may be transforming itself into a body somewhat akin to the now superseded Committee
of European Securities Regulators, better known by its acronym, CESR.36
CONCLUSION
We could indulge in more, much more, speculation as to the future of capital market regulation
in developed markets. But for now, let’s leave the speculating to the punters and the hedge
funds, and take a look back in five years’ time.
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This essay is based on the presentation, “The Wider Context: The Future of Capital Market Regulation in
Developed Markets”, Local Capital Markets Development Legal and Regulatory Work Advisory Panel, EBRD,
London, UK, 15 April 2011.
1
Even finer distinctions have developed such as “emerging”, “transitional” and “frontier” markets.
2
The G7 expanded to 19 countries and the European Union in 1999 due to the financial crises of the late 1990s and
a recognition that emerging economies had been excluded from global financial discussion and governance. The
countries added in 1999 were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Turkey. In September 2009, the G20 formally
replaced the then G8 as the major forum for discussions among finance ministers and central bankers.
3
‘LSE and Canada’s TMX agree merger’, Financial Times, London, 8 February 2011.
4
Ibid.
5
“Securities regulatory regimes around the world, largely developed on the conceptual basis of segregated national
markets, are fast being outpaced by market developments and are finding themselves unable to address effectively
the realities of the accelerating integration of global capital markets”. Aaron Unterman (2008), “Exporting risk:
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global implications of the securitization of U.S. housing debt” Hastings Business Law Journal, Vol. 4(1), pp. 77135. 
6
See Cally Jordan (2009), “Does ‘F’ stand for failure: the legacy of the Financial Stability Forum”, Legal Studies
Research Papers, Melbourne Law School Research Paper No. 429, pp. 1-28.
7
The Australian Parliament rejected the merger on April 5 2011 after the Foreign Investment Review Board
determined a merger was not in Australia’s best interests. 
8
“There is no serious alternative available. The status quo would entrench the continuation of European financial
market fragmentation. This means lost benefits. Lost opportunities … with European savings diverted to foreign
market places.” Alexandre Lamfalussy (2001), “Final report of the committee of wise men on the regulation of
European securities markets”, Brussels, 15 February 2001, pp. 1-115, 8 (‘Lamfalussy Report’). 
9
Stéphane Rottier and Nicolas Véron (2010), “The new disintegration of finance”, Breugel Institute, 10 September
2010, pp. 1-2.
10
Lingling Wei and Carol Chan (2011), “Turmoil stings Yuan bonds”, Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2011, p 1.
The term describes the RMB dominated, Hong Kong based bond market and is “driven by the amount of RMB
deposits available for investment in Hong Kong and by the supply of debt from issuers in mainland China”: Luis
Sanchez (2010), “What is the dim sum bond market and why it could be the next bubble”, Business Today,
Princeton University, 13 August 2010, p. 1. 
11
See John C. Coffee (2002), “Competition among securities markets: a path dependant perspective”, Columbia
University Law School, Center for Law and Economic Studies Research Paper No. 192, 25 March 2002, pp. 1-32.
12
James Wilson (2011), “BaFin approves Deutsche Börse-NYSE merger”, Financial Times, London, 12 September
2011. 
13
There is a cross listing alliance consisting of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, BM&FBovespa of Brazil,
the National Stock Exchange of India, the Bombay Stock Exchange, Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the two
Russian exchanges that are in the process of merging - Micex and RTS - will cross-list each others' stock index
futures and index options contracts. 
14
Selling information flows and creating or reinforcing vertical “silos” of complementary businesses such as
clearing and settlement.
15
“The challenge of great exchanges”, Financial Times, London, 13 February 2011. It is estimated that 37% of
revenues of the proposed NYSE-Euronext-DeutscheBĘrse will be from derivatives and not traditional equity
products.
16
Jeremy Grant (2011), “Six emerging market exchanges combine in cross-listing alliance”, Financial Times,
London, 13 October 2011. 
17
The recent bankruptcy of MF Global, with assets of $US 41 billion is the eighth largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history. At the time of writing $US163 million of client funds could not be accounted for. Tom Braithwaite, John
Gapper, Dan McCrum, Gregory Meyer, Kara Scannell and Hal Weitzman (2011), “‘It shouldn't have taken positions
so big - let alone the one it did’ - downfall of MF Global”, Financial Times, London, 5 November 2011. 
18
Although fiercely defended in the United States. See Cally Jordan and Pamela Hughes (2007), “Which way for
market institutions: the fundamental question of self regulation”, Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 205227.
19
Stephen O'Connor, ISDA Chairman, Managing Director and Global Head of OTC Client Clearing, recently gave
an address on derivatives regulation at which he stated: “Should the regulations in each country or region be
introduced without consistency, such institutions could be prevented from engaging in cross-border transactions and
executing their global risk management strategies efficiently. This could potentially lead to regulatory arbitrage,
segmented markets, reduction in liquidity, resulting in reduced market efficiency and increased systemic risk.”
Stephen O’Connor (2011), “Chairman’s address”, Morgan Stanley 2011 ISDA Annual Japan Conference: Shaping
the Future of Derivatives, 27 October 2011. 
20
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, an attempt was made to formally consolidate the two major financial
regulators in the United States, the SEC and the CFTC; although the attempt failed, there is now more formal
cooperative measures undertaken. However, the number of financial regulators in the United States has multiplied,
with the creation of new agencies such as the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, now under the aegis of the
Federal Reserve.
21
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 12 USC § 5301.
22
Professor Donald Langevoort speaking recently at the University of Sydney estimated only about 20% of DoddFrank reforms had been implemented. Donald Langvoort (2011), “Current U.S. and international trends in market
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and share trading regulation”, speech given at the Supreme Court of New South Wales Annual Corporate Law
Conference: New Trends in Sharemarket Regulation, 23 August 2011.
23
Three new principles of securities regulation dealing with systemic risk were added to the IOSCO Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation in June 2010:
1. Principle A (6) “The Regulator should have or contribute to a process to monitor, mitigate and manage
systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate.”
2. Principle H (32) “There should be procedures for dealing with the failure of a market intermediary in order
to minimize damage and loss to investors and to contain systemic risk.”
ϯ͘ Principle I (38) “Securities settlement systems and central counterparties should be subject to regulatory
and supervisory requirements that are designed to ensure that they are fair, effective and efficient and that
they reduce systemic risk.”
24
Securities Act of 1933 15 U.S.C. 77a-77mm. 
25
Dating back to the 1930s in the United States.
26
The FSA is due to be replaced by two agencies in 2013. These are the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The mandate of the PRA is promotion of stable and prudent operation of
the financial system, regulation of all deposit taking institutions, insurers and investment banks. The mandate of the
FCA is the regulation of conduct in retail, wholesale financial markets and firms outside the scope of the PRA, a
mandate which may be wider than the new U.S. Bureau of Consumer and Financial Regulation.
27
In the UK, for example this will now be the mandate of the Financial Conduct Authority to commence in 2013. 
28
Sharlene Goff and Elaine Moore (2011), “Banks prepare for deluge of PPI complaints”, Financial Times, London,
21 April 2011, p. 18. 
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